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THE OPINIONS OF ECONOMISTS AND
THE GENERAL PUBLIC ON FREE TRADE
A 1990 survey of economists employed in the
United States found that more than 90 percent gener-
ally agreed with the proposition that the use of tariffs
and import quotas reduced the average standard of
living.1 These results are more than a decade old;
however, few economists would disagree with the
following statement that appeared in 2001: “The
consensus among mainstream economists on the
desirability of free trade remains almost universal.”2
On the other hand, the general public is much
more reluctant to reduce trade barriers than econ-
omists are. Well-publicized protests against meet-
ings to discuss the reduction of trade barriers have
become common. The concern about free trade
policies is not limited to the protestors. In a 1998
survey, only 32 percent of the general public was
in favor of eliminating tariffs and other import
restrictions to achieve lower prices when the cost
would be that certain jobs in import-competing
industries would likely be eliminated.3 Meanwhile,
49 percent were more sympathetic to the argument
that tariffs are necessary to protect jobs.
WHY ECONOMISTS SUPPORT FREE
TRADE POLICIES
Underlying the consensus among economists
is the judgment that nations are better off with free
1 See Alston, Kearl, and Vaughan (1992).
2 See Mayda and Rodrik (2001, p. 1).
3 See Reilly (1999).
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I
am very pleased to be back in Louisville again,
to meet tomorrow with the board of the
Louisville branch of the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis and today to discuss trade issues with
the Louisville Society of Financial Analysts. Trade
is an important issue for the United States and for
the entire world. My purpose is to review the funda-
mentals of the argument for free trade in the hope
that returning to basics will be helpful to public
understanding of trade issues.
A well-known joke says that you could lay all
the world’s economists end to end and they still
wouldn’t reach a conclusion. And Harry Truman’s
famous plea was for a one-armed economist. In fact,
there is no issue on which economists are more
closely in agreement than the fundamental case
for free trade. Economists end to end see eye to eye
on this issue, and the two-armed economist does
not go through the usual dance “on the one hand,
on the other hand” when discussing the fundamental
case for free trade. There are special cases and tem-
porary exceptions that modify the case for free trade,
but they do not challenge the basic argument.
Despite this consensus among economists,
substantial public opposition to reducing trade bar-
riers exists. In fact, opposition can be found at both
the left and right ends—and the middle—of the
political spectrum.
In my remarks today, I will address three ques-
tions. First, why do economists support free trade
policies? Second, what are the reasons for public
opposition? Third, what can be done to narrow the
gap between economists and those opposed to free
trade?
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that the
views I express here are mine and do not necessarily
reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve
System. I thank my colleagues at the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis for their comments—especially
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trade than with policies restricting trade. Before I
begin discussing the analytics of international trade,
let’s begin by thinking about our own behavior. Most
of us have jobs. With the income from our jobs, we
buy numerous goods and services—food, clothing,
fuel, houses, entertainment, and so on. Our econ-
omic behavior reflects the fact that we live in a highly
interdependent world in which jobs are specialized.
A typical household buys goods and services pro-
duced not only in its home state but also throughout
the United States and the rest of the world. Indeed,
each of us directly consumes only a tiny proportion
of our production—the most important exception
is household services, such as cleaning, cooking,
and yard care. Would our lives be better if each of
us individually grew all of our food, made all our
clothes, pumped and refined all our oil, built our
own houses and made movies? Obviously, the
answer is no. Even the early settlers on the American
frontier relied on others to make many of their tools,
for example. Pure self-sufficiency is a recipe for a
Stone Age standard of living.
Broadening the arena for trade just a little would
help just a little. Would the residents of Kentucky
be better off if they traded only with others in
Kentucky and had no economic relationships with
the rest of the United States? Once again, the answer
is no. By specializing in certain activities, regions
as well as individuals are able to maximize the value
of work effort. By producing most goods and services
for sale to others, we trade our output for the goods
and services that we are not especially adept at
producing.
The wisdom of specialization and exchange that
holds for individual and interregional trade holds
for international trade as well. Nearly 200 years ago,
the economist David Ricardo demonstrated the gains
from trade. To explain the principle of comparative
advantage he used the example of England and
Portugal trading cloth and port wine. The trade
made both countries better off. His work was a
generalization of Adam Smith’s great insights con-
cerning the gains from exchange.
Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage
showed that nations, similar to individuals, gain
from trade. Assuming that relative prices, such as
the price of an apple relative to the price of a shirt,
differ across two countries, then both countries can
gain from trading with each other. An important
point is that, even if the average worker in one coun-
try is more productive in producing each and every
good than the average worker in the other country,
gains from trade are possible. The gains from trade
depend on comparative and not absolute advantage.
I believe it was Paul Samuelson, the first Nobel
Laureate in the United States, who gave this example:
Suppose an economist is a brilliant theorist and the
best typist in the university. Should the economist
type her own papers? Clearly, the economist will
be more productive if she hires a secretary to do
the typing; she, the economist, has a comparative
advantage in developing economic theory and he,
the secretary, has a comparative advantage in typing.
The same principle of comparative advantage
holds for a country. If Portugal can produce both
port wine and cloth with fewer hours of labor input
per unit of output than can England, it will still pay
Portugal to produce wine and trade with England
for cloth, assuming that England is comparatively
more efficient in producing cloth than wine. The
proposition generalizes to many goods and many
countries. As long as resources move into those
activities in which the country is most advantaged
or least disadvantaged, then all trading partners
can be better off by trading some of the output that
they produce at relatively low cost for some of the
output that they produce at relatively high cost.
So far my discussion has focused on what econ-
omists term the “static gains” from trade. These gains
arise from the reallocation of existing productive
resources and the subsequent international trade.
Free trade might also generate dynamic gains by
stimulating economic growth. Economic theory
suggests a number of routes by which free trade
stimulates economic growth by increasing either
productive resources or technological change. In
practice, these increases are often triggered by the
spur of competition when countries liberalize trade.
There are many success stories of growth through
trade, and no such stories of growth through self-
sufficiency as far as I know.
An important growth mechanism arises when
trade raises a country’s real income, some of which
is saved. The increased saving raises the availability
of funds for investment spending, which augments
a country’s productive capital stock. Developing
countries with relatively liberal trade regimes also
commonly attract capital from abroad, further aug-
menting resources devoted to capital formation.
Free trade also increases the possibility that a
firm importing a capital good will be able to locate
a supplier who will provide a good that more nearly
meets its specifications. The better the match, the
larger is the increase in the firm’s productivity. A
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related idea is that international trade may spur the
diffusion of technology by increasing the commercial
contacts between employees in firms from different
countries.
Another route for economic growth arises due
to the increased competitive pressures associated
with international trade. By reducing trade barriers,
firms that were previously protected are now faced
with competitors and, unless they become more
efficient and responsive to consumers, they will
perish. The result is that productive resources will
be used more efficiently in producing goods that
consumers desire.
A final route arises because, as trade barriers
are reduced, the size of the market that a firm faces
increases. In some cases, firms may be able to expand
output at lower per-unit costs. The larger market size
might also spur increased research and development
spending that could spur additional growth.
How does the theory of international trade work
in practice? Specifically, does international trade
allow a country to achieve a higher real income than
it would have otherwise achieved? The short answer
is yes, but it is hard to pin down by precisely how
much.4For a country as a whole, the gains are bound
to be less for a large country such as the United States
than for a small country such as Belgium. Clearly,
the costs to Belgium of cutting off all trade with
those outside its borders would be huge, as would
also be true for a state with roughly similar popula-
tion, such as Ohio.
There is an enormous professional literature
on cases in which some protection might be justified
or justified for a short period of time. My own judg-
ment is that few of these arguments really stand up
to rigorous analysis. I believe that the correct starting
point for analysis is always that trade restriction
imposes net costs on society. That is, protection
produces gains for some and costs for others, but
the net of gains and costs is negative.
The professional literature provides estimates
of the cost of protecting a variety of industries. It is
not uncommon to find estimates indicating that the
cost per job saved is more than $500,000 or in some
cases even as large as $1 million.
REASONS FOR PUBLIC OPPOSITION
If the logic and evidence supporting free trade
is so convincing for economists, why is the general
public reluctant to embrace free trade? I’ll develop
three themes in attempting to answer this question.
The first theme is that many people do not under-
stand the benefits of free trade. I’ll call this “Theme
LU,” where “LU” stands for “lack of understanding.”
The second theme is that certain industry groups
are able to apply their political power to gain protec-
tion, usually because those who bear the costs of
protection are inadequately represented in the politi-
cal process. I’ll call this “Theme PP,” where “PP”
stands for “political power.” My third theme is that
protection can result from a fully reasoned prefer-
ence to pay the costs to provide protection because
the costs are spread across a wide number of people
and because those who are protected would be
severely impacted by free trade. I’ll call this “Theme
RP,” where “RP” stands for “reasoned preference.”
A good place to begin developing these themes
is to reflect first on the case for free trade within
the United States. One of the great achievements of
the U.S. Constitution was to ban trade restrictions,
with minor exceptions, across state lines. Since the
early days of the United States, trade within the coun-
try has been a great source of economic growth.
Some of the transitions have been painful for regions
losing jobs, and yet public support for free trade
within the United States has never been shaken. New
England, especially, has seen many of its manufac-
turing industries move to other parts of the country
and outside the United States as well. The movement
of the textile industry to the South is the most famous
example. To this day, a traveler in New England can
see numerous textile mills built in the 19th century
still standing, but converted to other uses.
The job losses in New England were painful, and
it took many years to restore full employment there.
Workers had to retrain, and some found that they
could never restore their previous level of income.
Yet the nation supported the industrial transforma-
tion, and not just because the Constitution demanded
it. New jobs appeared in southern mills, lifting many
workers out of rural poverty. The situation was one
of “us against them” but the us and the them were
in the same country, though in different regions.
In some cases, government aid softened the blow
suffered by newly unemployed workers in New
England, but for the most part they and their families
bore the costs of the industrial transformation.
Once the transformation was complete, both
New England and the South gained from the new
patterns of trade within the United States. The
regions as a whole gained, but obviously many 4 See Frankel and Romer (1999) and Irwin and Terviö (2000).
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individuals and individual firms in New England
did not. Trade does create losers, even though
regions as a whole gain.
The gains from international trade are harder
to understand than the gains from interregional
trade. Within a country, it is easy to see that trade
creates jobs in some regions and destroys jobs in
other regions. Some of the adjustments from inter-
national trade involve job creation abroad and job
losses at home. The gains from such trade are much
harder to understand. This lack of understanding—
my Theme LU—has a lot to do with support for
restrictions on international trade.
Let me try to dispel some of the poor understand-
ing of this issue. I’ll focus on job gains and losses.
On the surface, in any given country it appears that
exports add jobs and imports cost jobs when workers
in the home country find that they cannot compete
with low-cost goods from abroad. So, it appears that
a country could add jobs in total by subsidizing
exports and blocking imports. Let’s follow the logic
of just such a policy, and let’s assume that no coun-
tries abroad retaliate. Let’s also assume that the home
country is capable of producing all the goods that
had been imported, so that blocking all imports does
not create any untenable shortages of particular
commodities.
Suppose exporters insist on payment in dollars
for the goods they sell. How will foreigners obtain
dollars once all their exports to the United States are
cut off? Will U.S. banks lend the dollars, even though
foreign firms have no possibility of selling goods in
the United States to obtain dollars to repay loans?
The answer is obvious.
Or perhaps U.S. exporters will accept foreign
currency in payment for the goods sold abroad. What
will they do with the foreign currencies? The curren-
cies cannot be used to buy goods to import into the
United States because all imports are blocked. The
foreign currencies cannot be sold abroad for dollars
because foreigners have no dollars to sell as a con-
sequence of not being able to earn dollars through
sale of goods to the United States. Exporters could
use the foreign currencies to buy assets abroad, such
as land, but presumably at some point they will tire
of exchanging all their goods for foreign assets. 
This argument makes clear that the heart of the
argument against restricting imports is that doing
so restricts exports. Every exporting firm and every
worker employed by such a firm ought to have an
intense interest in maintaining free trade. The con-
nection may seem remote, but it is real: every dollar
of blocked imports is also, at least eventually, a dol-
lar of blocked exports. To point out the folly of the
view that exports are good and imports bad, a 19th
century economist satirically wondered whether
the best outcome would be for ships transporting
goods between countries to sink so that all countries
could have exports without imports.
It is clear that imports and exports are connected
in a fundamental way. Nevertheless—and this is a
key point—a dollar of blocked imports has concen-
trated positive effects for the protected industry but
diffuse negative effects across all export industries,
amounting to pennies per item for any given export
industry. In terms of jobs, blocking imports has obvi-
ous job benefits for the protected industry, whereas
the job losses from reduced exports are spread
widely across many industries. Trade restriction
produces concentrated benefits and extremely 
diffuse and hard to understand costs. The costs are
borne by export firms and their workers and by
consumers who pay higher prices.
This fact, that protection produces concentrated
gains and diffuse losses, is the source of Theme PP.
Industries suffering from imports have a great incen-
tive to seek redress through the political process,
and they are often successful in doing so. Industries
suffering a handful of job losses, and consumers
paying a few pennies more for the goods they buy,
may not even notice the losses. In any event, because
the losses are individually small, those bearing the
losses have no incentive to organize politically to
fight protection. But keep in mind that a job loss
here, and two or three there, can add up to many
job losses per job saved in a protected industry.
My third theme is that fully informed voters
might rationally prefer protection in some cases.
Being unemployed, regardless of its length, is a
noteworthy cost that generates opposition to pro-
posed trade policy changes from both those likely
to be adversely affected and those who empathize
with them. 
Consider the policy choices available to policy-
makers who are trying to protect jobs. There are
really only three options. One is to swallow hard
and do nothing. This option may sound cruel, but
the fact is that the government leaves family and
markets to handle many types of misfortunes that
befall us. A second is to provide adjustment assis-
tance to help workers make the transition from
industries suffering intense import competition to
new industries. 
A third option is to impose import restrictions.
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As I have already emphasized, these restrictions
impose costs on the rest of society. A natural question
is why individuals, including those with relatively
low incomes, should bear the costs of maintaining
jobs in other industries. The question is particularly
pointed when workers in protected industries are
earning wages above the national average.
In some cases, certainly, protection improves the
job and income prospects of low-income workers.
Many voters do appear willing to support trade
restrictions to protect such workers. Protection in
these circumstances seems to fit my Theme RP—
that voters have a reasoned preference to bear the
costs of protecting low-income workers. The willing-
ness, therefore, to support trade restrictions may in
some cases simply reflect a concern for others.
This sense of community may extend beyond
U.S. borders. Many U.S. consumers appear willing
to pay higher prices for items produced under better
working conditions in developing countries. More-
over, most Americans favor linking labor standards
to trade. For example, the 1999 Program on Inter-
national Attitudes survey found that 93 percent of
respondents felt that as part of international trade
agreements countries should be required to main-
tain minimum standards for working conditions.5
However, this linkage may instead reflect self-interest.
By effectively raising the cost of its competitors,
higher labor standards would serve the interests of
those being harmed by the imports from low-cost
competitors.
Similar to linking labor standards to trade, some
sentiment exists for linking environmental standards
to trade. Underlying this sentiment is a belief that
by stimulating growth, trade contributes to environ-
mental problems. Some of the concern about the
environment can be linked to U.S. jobs. One argu-
ment is that lower environmental standards abroad
make the U.S. a less-competitive location and induce
firms to relocate. Thus, by harmonizing environ-
mental standards, the disadvantages of production
in the United States due to environmental controls
would be eliminated.
Many economists, however, would argue that
environmental problems should be handled nation-
ally and that international differences in environ-
mental standards are natural. Moreover, economic
growth provides both the resources and the demand
to raise a country’s environmental standards. In
fact, the ideal tradeoffs between economic growth
and environmental quality that a country might
make are likely to depend on its level of economic
development. For example, research by economists
Gene Grossman and Alan Krueger finds an inverted
U-shaped relationship between pollution and
economic development.6 For very poor countries,
increases in per capita gross domestic product are
associated with worsening environmental conditions.
Beyond some income level, however, increases in
per capita gross domestic product are associated
with improving environmental conditions; wealthier
societies can and do spend more on pollution con-
trol. The turning point varies for the specific pollu-
tant, but in almost every case the turning point
occurs at a per capita income of $8,000 or less in
1985 dollars. Thus, raising the income of poor coun-
tries, a direct result of increased international trade,
may be the most important factor in improving
environmental conditions in low-income countries.
Despite the insights from my second and third
themes, I return to Theme LU—that attitudes toward
trade are heavily influenced by a lack of understand-
ing. Quite generally, the public fails to see any broad-
based gains from trade. For example, the 1999
Program on International Attitudes survey found
that Americans viewed the benefits of trade as flow-
ing to business, rather than to themselves or to
American workers in general. Although the survey
did not ask respondents whether they thought gains
from trade went to foreigners, I’m guessing that many
Americans do believe that foreigners harvest the
gains and the United States loses from trade.
The difficulty of envisioning broad-based gains
for the United States is understandable. It is difficult
for the general public to perceive that reducing
import barriers lowers prices, raises average wages,
and improves jobs across a wide range of U.S. indus-
tries. It is also difficult for the general public to envi-
sion how freer trade will spur economic growth
that will improve its well-being. Because U.S. inter-
national trade is already largely free, the gains for
an average U.S. individual of fostering free trade are
small. In other words, the gains from even freer trade
as a share of total economic activity in the United
States are relatively small; however, the total gains
are substantial.
The general public is also concerned about the
large and increasing U.S. trade deficit. Some of the
concern reflects a view that U.S. exports should
equal U.S. imports. This view fails to appreciate
6 See Grossman and Krueger (1995).




that a country’s trade balance and its capital account
are very closely related. In a speech November 14,
2003, at the Tucson chapter of the Association for
Investment Management Research, I examined this
relationship. I do not have time today to develop the
points I made in that speech, so I will summarize
some key points.
Via basic accounting, a country’s capital account
surplus is equal to its current account deficit. For
simplicity, let’s view the current account deficit as
the trade deficit. A common mistake is to treat inter-
national capital flows as though they are passively
responding to what is happening in the trade
account. In fact, investors abroad buy U.S. assets not
for the purpose of financing the U.S. trade deficit
but because they believe these assets are sound
investments, promising a good combination of safety
and return. On a personal level, every one here has
the option of moving funds abroad, for example,
through mutual funds that invest in foreign stocks
and bonds. Why is the net capital flow into rather
than out of the United States? The reason is that for
most investors the United States is the capital market
of choice. There is no better place in the world to
invest.
In sum, the United States has created for itself
a comparative advantage in capital markets, and
we should not be surprised that investors all over
the world come to buy the product. As investors
exploit the opportunities provided by U.S. financial
markets, trade deficits can arise. Thus, my view is
that our current trade deficits are not a cause for
alarm because on the whole they reflect extremely
positive forces driving the U.S. capital account.
NARROWING THE GAP
Now let me turn to the issue of how to narrow
the gap between the opinions of economists and
the general public. The first response of economists
to narrowing the gap involves education. That is
the obvious implication of Theme LU. However, the
educational challenge is large because the majority
of the general public will not be sitting through an
international trade course. These communication
issues are especially important because economists’
arguments are often focused on issues that the
general public tends to ignore or, at least, downplay.
Economists often focus on consumption aspects
of international trade. They stress that free trade
allows for increases in well-being because consumers
can buy more and varied goods at lower prices.
Public discussions, however, usually focus on jobs
and production.
The statement that imports destroy some jobs
is certainly correct; however, the key point is that
trade causes a change in the distribution of jobs and
no major change in the number of jobs, once adjust-
ments to changing trade patterns are complete.
The nature of the popular discussion highlights the
job destruction aspects of trade and downplays the
job creation aspects of trade. It is far easier to identify
a closed plant or laid-off factory workers than it is
to find the new economic activity, which is often
widely dispersed, resulting from a reduction in trade
barriers.
It is easy to see why workers losing their jobs
would be passionately opposed to international
trade. Conversely, the diffuse beneficiaries of free
trade may not even realize that their good fortune
arises from free trade. To maintain support for free
trade policies, therefore, it is important to identify
export success stories and to stress the broad-based
gains to consumers stemming from lower prices.
In light of the costs imposed on some by trade,
an argument can be made that programs should be
available to reduce the cost for those harmed. The
trade adjustment assistance program, which is
administered by the U.S. Department of Labor, allows
those who lose their jobs because of increased
imports to receive unemployment compensation
for an additional period beyond that received by
other displaced workers. In addition, trade adjust-
ment assistance recipients can also participate in
retraining programs plus receive out-of-area job
search allowances and moving expenses. 
To the extent that this program is sufficiently
funded and successful, it is possible that this program
would reduce workers’ lobbying efforts against
trade liberalization. Even if voters are motivated by
their perceptions of collective well being and not
simply their own individual well being, trade adjust-
ment assistance might increase support by those
who gain and those who lose.
A third way to bridge the gap between supporters
and detractors of trade liberalization is to increase
the topics involved in trade negotiations. Sentiment
is strong for linking labor and environmental issues
with trade negotiations. Sentiment also exists for
multilateral trade negotiations to deal with invest-
ment policy, competition policy, electronic com-
merce, and better enforcement of intellectual
property rights. What is unclear is whether such
changes would ultimately increase the prospects
for liberalizing trade. Expanding the agenda might
provide negotiators with more opportunities for
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compromise; however, expanding the agenda might
also bog down negotiations by introducing issues
upon which compromise is very difficult.
Negotiations to reduce trade barriers are moti-
vated by the desire to reap the benefits from freer
trade. Negotiations—whether they are multilateral,
regional, or bilateral—are always contentious. The
multilateral agreements underpinning the World
Trade Organization attempt to counteract protec-
tionist pressures. As a last resort, the dispute settle-
ment process allows countries to retaliate against a
member found in violation of an agreement.
Retaliation provides a mechanism to enforce
the treaty. We might also think of targeted retaliation
as a way to make highly visible the job losses in
export industries when a country imposes import
restrictions. As argued earlier, in the absence of
targeted retaliation, job losses in export industries
are widely scattered and difficult to identify. Targeted
retaliation, however, can create visible, concentrated
costs on certain export industries—costs that are
designed to create political opposition to import
restrictions. I might note that nations ratifying the
WTO treaty were very familiar with the retaliation
rules, as they had been applied for many years under
WTO’s predecessor organization, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or the GATT.
CONCLUSION
I can summarize my perspective on international
trade in a few words. Free trade is a policy that
increases economic well being for a country as a
whole. Specialization and exchange are the routes
that generate the benefits. Specialization allows for
increased productivity and higher wages, while open
markets are more competitive and yield lower prices
for consumers.
I’ve suggested three themes as to why free-trade
policy continues to be a matter of controversy:
first, that many trade issues are poorly understood;
second, the concentrated nature of adverse trade
effects combined with the diffuse nature of trade
gains creates a political dynamic favoring protection
in some cases; and, third, in some cases voters may
prefer to pay the costs of protection for the purpose
of sheltering vulnerable groups from the full rigors
of open international markets.
The challenge for educators, economists, and
policymakers is to find ways to increase political
support for free trade. It is clear that there is much
work left to be done.
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